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Abstract 
Wages are not only money wages. For an employee, the wage consists of all the benefits 
that he or she is entitled to as a result of employment. His or her total remuneration for work 
is composed of money wages plus non-wage benefits such as earnings-related or 
employment-related insurance rights. In Europe, earnings-related insurance mainly takes the 
form of public and negotiated collective systems. Hence the individual value is hard to 
observe. This article is an original attempt to determine the individual value of certain public 
and negotiated insurance rights. A money value for earnings-related survivors´ pension rights 
is estimated and added to the money wage to create an extended wage measure. We use 
Swedish micro data to analyse what the inclusion of different insurance rights might mean for 
wage differentials and wage dispersion. The study indicates that wage inequality is 
understated when non-wage benefits in the form of survivors´ pension rights are excluded 
from the compensation measure and that a more complete picture of wage differentials is 
obtained when these rights are accounted for. 
 
Key words: non-wage benefits, wage inequality, earnings-related insurance rights, 
survivors´ pension rights   2
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I. Introduction 
Traditionally, studies of wage differentials do not provide us with the complete picture of 
differences in remuneration for work. One reason is that compensation other than money 
wages is not included. This can result in misjudged wage differences, since wages are not 
only money wages. For an employee, the wage consists of all the benefits that he or she is 
entitled to as a result of employment, including earnings-related insurance rights. There are 
very few European studies of earnings-related or employment-related insurance rights. Most 
studies have been made in the U.S. (see for example Granqvist 1998 for an overview). The 
main reason for this is that in the U.S. earnings-related or employment-related insurance is 
mainly private insurance taken out by the employer for his or her employees. In this case, the 
individual value of the non-wage benefit is considered to be equal to the insurance premium 
paid. In Europe, however, earnings-related insurance is mainly public and negotiated. 
Insurance rights in politically determined social insurance and negotiated insurance 
determined by labour market organizations are collective and not actuarially fair to the 
individual. We cannot simply observe the individual value of these insurance rights. But we 
know from the design of the schemes that the relation between these rights and money wage 
is seldom the same for different categories of wage earners. The uniform premium or 
contribution to the social insurance scheme  - and to a certain extent also to negotiated 
insurance schemes - is partly a tax for individuals whose risk is lower than the average risk 
and partly a subsidy to individuals whose risk is higher than average. For example, sickness 
absence is higher among women than among men but nevertheless the percentage 
contribution to the sickness benefit earnings-related social insurance system is the same for 
women as for men. In the perfect labour market these differences in actuarial premiums 
should have an effect on money wages and money wage differentials should be larger. 
Further, the negotiated insurance scheme is organized differently in different sectors and 
even if the rules are formally equal for everybody, the consequences of the rules can be 
different owing to different labour market behaviour (see for example Ståhlberg 1990, 
1995).   4
This article is a unique attempt to determine the individual value of certain public and 
negotiated insurance rights and include these in the wage concept. We use Swedish money 
wages and insurance rules from 1995. The insurance rights we focus on are survivors´ 
pension rights stipulated by law and by negotiated agreements. We analyse what the 
inclusion of individual insurance rights in the wage concept might mean for wage differentials 
and wage dispersion. 
The political process determines social insurance, while agreements in the labour 
market determine the negotiated insurance. Section II describes possible reasons why 
negotiated insurance is attractive as a non-wage benefit. With the insurance rules as the point 
of departure, we generate a hypothesis of how insurance rights could differ between 
different wage earners. Section III gives a short overview of the rules in the different 
insurance schemes. Section IV discusses previous studies. Section V describes how we 
estimate individual insurance rights. In section VI we present the estimated insurance rights 
for different categories and analyse what the inclusion of public and negotiated insurance 
rights in the wage concept might mean for wage differentials and wage dispersion. A 
summary and conclusions are given in the final section VII. 
 
II. Theoretical Background 
In economic theory there are many explanations of the incidence of non-wage benefits. In 
her overview, Granqvist (1998) highlights (1) their role in maintaining inequality between 
blue-collar and white-collar workers, indicating that non-wage benefits are more unequally 
distributed than money wages, (2) their potential as a tool for counteracting the effects of the 
solidarity wage policy,
1 (3) that they may enable employers to engage in wage discrimination 
against certain employee groups, and (4) that they can counteract the equalising effect of 
progressive income tax. These explanations could also hold for the Swedish negotiated 
insurance schemes. 
Negotiated insurance in Sweden has favourable tax-rules both for the employer and 
for the employees. The insurance premium is tax-free for the employee and free from social 
                                                                   
1 See Edin and Holmlund (1995) for a discussion of the solidarity wage policy in Sweden.   5
insurance contributions for the employer. Certain disbursements are free from income tax. 
With high marginal taxes on money wages, the tax advantage is larger for high-income 
earners than for low-income earners. 
Negotiated insurance in Sweden may counteract and neutralize the effects of the 
solidarity social policy. The rate of compensation in the negotiated insurance schemes can 
be much higher for those who have incomes above the social insurance ceiling than for those 
who have lower incomes. (The social insurance ceiling is approximately equivalent to 150 
per cent of an average industrial worker´s annual wage before taxes.) This may compensate 
high-income earners for the fact that the compensation rate in the Swedish social insurance 
scheme is the opposite: it is lower for those who have incomes above the social insurance 
ceiling than for those who have lower incomes. For example, a private white-collar worker 
whose annual wage income is below the social insurance ceiling has a right to a survivors´ 
pension from the social insurance system, but one whose income is above the ceiling has a 
right to a survivors´ pension from both the social insurance and the negotiated insurance 
schemes. When he or she dies, the surviving spouse receives an annual pension from the 
negotiated scheme for the rest of his or her life and from the uniform social insurance system 
for six months. The pension amount from social insurance is based on portions of wages up 
to the ceiling, the pension amount from negotiated insurance on portions of wages above the 
ceiling. The wage income redistribution effect of the social insurance rights, emanating from 
the rule that benefits are not paid on incomes above the ceiling, is thus counteracted by the 
rules of the negotiated insurance. 
MW = money wage 
SB = social insurance benefits 
NB = negotiated insurance benefits 
H = high income earners 
L = low income earners 
 
(SB/MW)H < (SB/MW)L 
(NB/MW) H > (NB/MW)L 
Negotiated insurance schemes in Sweden may attract a desired type of worker. 
Mostly they give special benefits to married people (sometimes also to cohabitants and 
registered partners) and to those who have young children. This might attract stable   6
workers, who are assumed to be married persons and families with children to a greater 
extent than unmarried and childless persons. Survivors´ pensions may be used as a tool to 
circumvent non-discrimination laws and agreements. It may also be taken as a non-wage 
marriage premium in the labour market.
2 
 
III. The Survivors´ Pension. 1995 Rules. 
1. Social insurance 
In this study the focus is on the survivors´ pension. 
The earnings-related survivors´ pension in the social insurance system from 1990 – 
the year the widow´s pension was abolished in social insurance – consists of a survivors´ 
pension to men, women and children. Those who were middle aged or older in 1990, when 
the rules changed, receive a widow´s pension under special transitional  rules. Others receive 
an adaptation pension, which lasts for six months or until the youngest child is twelve years 
old. Cohabitants who do not have children in common are not entitled to an adaptation 
pension. The pension amount is based on the deceased person´s old age pension from the 
earnings-related ATP system and comes to 40 per cent of his or her actual or hypothetical 
ATP. If there are infant children who receive a child pension, the parent´s compensation 
from the ATP will shrink to 20 per cent. This means that the widow/widower has to “give 
up” a certain share of his or her pension to the children, which is advantageous from point of 
view of taxation. 
Children receive a child pension from the social insurance system if the father, 
mother or both have died. It is paid until the child is 18, or, if he or she is studying, until the 
age of 20. The child pension from the ATP system is 30 per cent of the deceased parent´s 
old age pension from the ATP (actual or hypothetical) for the first child. Each additional 
child receives 20 per cent of the parent´s ATP. However, the total percentage cannot 
exceed 100. 
                                                                   
2 For a discussion of the Swedish marriage premium see Richardson (1997, 2000).   7
2. The negotiated insurance schemes 
Negotiated insurance schemes are based on collective agreements, and cover almost all 
employees in Sweden. There are four large negotiated insurance schemes in Sweden, 
covering private white-collar workers, private blue-collar workers, state employees, and 
local authority and county council employees. The four systems are similar in principle, but 
are constructed according to the special conditions in each sector. 
The survivors´ pension from the negotiated schemes has several components. 
Pensions are paid to widows, widowers and children of private white-collar workers, state 
employees, and local authority and county council employees who work for more than 40 
per cent of full time. Only blue-collar workers in the private sector lack a survivors´ pension. 
The definition of children eligible to pensions varies. The widow´s and widower´s pensions 
cease if they remarry. The  pension amount is determined in different ways for 
widows/widowers and children in the different schemes, but they all have the common 
feature that the widow or widower has to give up a certain share of her or his pension to the 
children, which results in tax advantages. 
 
Negotiated life insurance 
Every employee who works for more than 40 per cent of full time is covered by negotiated 
life insurance (TGL) from the age of 18. This life insurance is the same for all sectors and 
categories. The basic amount is 6 base amounts if the employee is between 18 and 54 years 
old when he or she dies. The base amount is an artificial amount constructed in order to 
make benefits inflation-indexed. One base amount is about 20 per cent of an average 
industrial worker´s wage before taxes. Over 55 years, benefits decrease (see Table 1). If 
there are children under 17 years old the highest amount will be paid irrespective of the age 
of the deceased person. The maximum for the child´s amount is set at two base amounts. All 
TGL compensation is exempt from taxes. 
 




Negotiated life insurance (TGL) 
________________________________________________________________ 
The age of    Basic amount  Age of children    Child´s amount 
the deceased    (net, in base        (net, in base amounts) 
      amounts) 
______________  ______________________________________________________________ 
Below 55   6    below 17   2 
55      5.5    17-18      1.5 
56      5    19-20      1 
57      4.5    21 and older    0 
58      4 
59      3.5 
60      3 
61      2.5 
62      2 
63      1.5 
64      1 
If children below 17  6 
_____________________________________________________________________________ 
Source: http://www.amf.se 
Private white-collar workers 
Further, private white-collar workers, state employees, and local authority and county 
council employees 28 years old and older are eligible to family pensions. The compensation 
varies between sectors. Among privately employed white-collar workers, only survivors of 
employees whose annual earnings exceed 7.5 base amounts are eligible. Widows a nd 
widowers are compensated for the rest of their lives provided that they do not remarry. 
Cohabitants receive no compensation. Children receive compensation until they are 20 years 









Family pension of private white-collar workers (ITP family pension) 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
Final wage of        Family pension 
the deceased (Y)      widow/widower    children £ 20 
        (gross, in base amounts)  (net, in base amounts) 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
0 <Y £ 7.5      0      0 
7.5 < Y  £ 20      Aj · [0.325 · (Y–7.5)]  Ak · [0.325 · (Y–7.5)] 
20 < Y £ 30      Aj · [0.325 · (20–7.5)+  Ak · [0.325 · (20–7.5) 
        +0.1625 · (Y–20)]  +0.1625 · (Y–20)] 
30 < Y        Aj · [0.325 · (20–7.5)  Ak · [0.325 · (20–7.5) 
        + 0.1625 · (30 – 20)]  + 0.1625 · (30 – 20)] 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
Category (j)        Aj      Ak 
 
Married, no children £ 20      1.00      0 
Married, one child £ 20      0.75      0.55 
Married, two children £ 20    0.75      0.75 
Married, three children (£ 20)    0.75      0.85 
Married, four children (£ 20)   0.75      0.95 
Married, five children (£ 20)    0.75      1.05 
Married, six children (£ 20)    0.75      1.15 
 
Unmarried, one child £ 20    0      0.75 
Unmarried, two children £ 20   0      1.10 
Unmarried, three children £ 20    0      1.35 
Unmarried, four children £ 20    0      1.50 
Unmarried, five children £ 20   0      1.60 




The family pension to survivors of state employees is paid during five years provided that the 
widow or widower does not remarry. Cohabitants who do not have children in common 
receive no compensation. The annual pension is 1.2 base amounts. Children receive 
compensation as long as they are below the age of 20. They receive half a base amount 
annually. See Table 3. 
If the deceased´s annual earnings exceed 7.5 base amounts a supplemented family 
pension is added. The rules are the same as for the family pension of private white-collar   10





Family pension of state employees (Family pension PA-91) 
___________________________________________________________ 
Number of children   Family pension 
widow/widower    children < 20 
      (gross, in base amounts)  (net, in base amounts) 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
0      1.2      0 
1      1      0.7 
2      1      1.2 
3      1      1.7 
4      1      2.2 
5      1      2.7 
6      1      3.2 
If children only    0      1.2+0.5·number of 






The supplemented family pension of state employees (PA-91) 
__________________________________________________________ 
The average wage (G)      Supplemented family pension 
of the final five years    widow/widower    children < 20 
in base amounts      (gross, in base amounts)  (net, in base amounts) 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
G > 7.5        the same construction as  the same construction as 
        for the family pension  for the family pension 
        of private    of private 
white-collar workers  white-collar workers 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
Source: http://www.spv.se 
Local authority and county council employees 
The family pension of local authority and county council employees is paid to widows and 
widowers for five years provided that they do not remarry. Cohabitants who do not have 
children in common receive no compensation. The pension is based on the deceased´s 
wages during her or his final seven years (from the year before death). The best five years   11
are selected and the pension is calculated on the basis of the average wage (K) during these 
five years. The family pension is 15 per cent of the average wage up to 20 base amounts 
and 7.5 per cent on portions of wages between 20 and 30 base amounts. 
The child pension is 10 per cent up to 7.5 base amounts, 28 per cent on portions of 
wages between 7.5 and 20 base amounts, and 14 per cent on portions of wages between 
20 and 30 base amounts. See Table 5. 
Table 5 
Family pension of local authority and county council employees (PA-KL) 
__________________________________________________________________ 
The average wage (K)      Family pension 
of the five best years    widow/widower    children < 20 
out of the final seven    (gross, in base amounts)  (net, in base amounts) 
in base amounts 
_______________________________________________________________________________ 
0 < K £ 7.5      0.15·K      Aq·0.10·K 
7.5 < K £20      0.15·K      Aq·[0.10·7.5+0.28· 
(K–7.5)] 
20 < K £ 30      0.15·20+0.075·(K-20)  Aq·[0.10·7.5+0.28· 
(20–7.5)+0.14·(K-20)] 
30 < K        0.15·20+0.075·(30-20)  Aq·[0.10·7.5+0.28· 
(20–7.5)+0.14·(30-20)] 
_______________________________________________________________________________ 
Number of  Aq 
children 
                1    1 
2    1.4 
3    1.6 
4    1.8 
5 or more 2.0 
_______________________________________________________________________________ 
Source: http://www.spv.se 
Table 6 summarizes  the negotiated survivors´ pensions. Table 7 shows the 









Summary of the negotiated survivors´ pensions 
____________________________________________________________________________ 
Private white-collar       Private blue-collar      State employees                  Local authority and 
workers                          workers                                                                 county council 
                                                                                                                  employees 
Life insurance  Life insurance  Life insurance  Life insurance 
 
Family pension if the 
annual wage > 7.5 base 
amounts 
  Family pension  Family pension 
    Supplemented family 
pension if the annual wage 
> 7.5 base amounts 
 
 
Child pension if the 
annual wage > 7.5 base 
amounts 
  Child pension  Child pension 
    Supplemented child pension 





The survivors´ pension from the earnings-related social insurance 
____________________________________________________________________________ 
                                                       All employees 
Adaptation pension  on portions of annual wage £ 7.5 base amounts 
Child pension  on portions of annual wage £ 7.5 base amounts 
 
IV. Previous Studies 
In the perfect insurance market each individual pays a premium which depends on the risk 
and the benefit amount. A perfect market is characterised by well-informed actors and an 
absence o f transaction costs. Everybody knows everything about risks, etc. The perfect 
market is a fiction for several reasons, such as asymmetric information (see for example Barr 
1992). However, the premiums of an actuarial insurance scheme will imitate the premiums of 
the perfect market. Certain characteristics are easy to observe, such as sex, age, marital 
status and number of children. For example, the actuarial value of the survivors´ pension is   13
higher for the worker who has many young children than for the worker who has one child 
only or no children at all. 
Since the earnings-related insurance schemes are mandatory and not marketable 
there is a problem of valuation, which should be kept in mind when we compare money 
wages with the actuarial values of the individual insurance rights. In previous studies using 
Swedish data, Selén and Ståhlberg (1996, 1998) calculate the actuarial value of the 
individual´s insurance rights in the public earnings-related old -age pension scheme and the 
negotiated old-age pension schemes. The 1998 study finds that, according to the coefficient 
of variation, relative variability increases when public and negotiated old -age earnings-
related pension rights are included in the wage measure. The 1996 study found that the 
work experience e ffect on wage growth was larger when old-age pension rights were 
included in the wage measure. Ståhlberg and Tegle (1998) find using Swedish data that the 
proportion of negotiated old-age pension rights to money wages is not equal for men and 
women. It is  lower for women, which means that women as a group receive less 
remuneration for work relative to men than is indicated by wage statistics. 
 
V. Calculations of the Survivors´ Pension Rights 
We study the individual non-wage benefits from the negotiated insurance schemes and the 
earnings-related social insurance system by calculating the actuarial value of the insurance 
provision for different categories of Swedish wage earners. 
P
N
i, j = pi · BN










i, j is the actuarial value of the negotiated survivors´ pension for individual i who 
belongs to the negotiated insurance scheme j. i = 1… n, j = 1…4. P
S
i is the actuarial value 
of the survivors´ pension from the earnings-related social insurance system for individual i. pi 
is the probability of the insurance situation occurring, that is, the mortality risk. B
N
i, j and B
S
i 
are the discounted values of the benefit amounts from negotiated insurance and social 
insurance respectively, and are determined by the rules of construction. B
N
i, j = B
N
i, j (age, 
married/cohabitant, annual wages, marginal tax, age of husband/wife/cohabitant, mean life   14
expectation, number of children, children´s age, rate of discount).  BS
i = B S
i 
(married/cohabitant, pension points in the national supplementary old age pension scheme, 




S are transaction costs. In the following we assume that A
N
j = A
S = 0 
The calculations of different individuals´ survivors´ pension rights,  P
N
i, j and P
S
i, 
have been made on the basis of a representative sample of the Swedish adult population 18-
64 years old. We have used data from household income survey of Statistics Sweden for 
1995. This yearly survey is based on about 10.000 households in all. The non-response rate 
is below 20 percent. Our estimation utilises data for the interviews in each household; 
interview data and register data from the tax authority and the Swedish Social Insurance 
board. All income from employment reported in the income statements are available to us 
and utilised. Wages for the latest seven years are required for the calculation of the family 
pensions of local authority and county council employees, table 5. For about 10 per cent of 
the individuals we know appropriate income variables. For the remaining 90 per cent, 
income approximations are calculated for1994 and 1995; some minor components are 
missing especially for 1994.3 
The survival probabilities and mortality rates (pi) are calculated by age and sex from 
official statistics for 1993-1997. Two per cent is chosen as the real rate of discount. The 
marginal tax is approximately 30 percent when the annual wage income is below the social 
insurance ceiling, otherwise approximately 60 percent. We assume that the widow/widower 
does not remarry. This is not a strong assumption since the economic incentives to remain 




                                                                   
3 We know the yearly base for the pensions in the social insurance system for all years, but income above the 
ceiling of 7.5 base amounts is censored. The 1994 and 1995 approximations are used to estimate whether an 
individual is below this ceiling for all years or not. When the 1994 and 1995 income sum is below 7.5 base amounts 
the social insurance base for each year is used. For the remaining individuals the largest real income 1994 or 1995 is 
imputed to all years. It turned out that the corresponding two groups were almost identical in size in our sample. A 





We compare the annual wage of private blue-collar workers, private white-collar workers, 
state employees and local authority and county council employees (local) using the extended 
wage measure. By wage we mean 
(1) money wage (MW) 
(2) money wage (MW) 
+ the actuarial value of the negotiated survivors´ pension (P
N
 = NW) 
+ the actuarial value of the public survivors´ pension (P
S = SW) 
= MW+NW+SW 
(3) money wage (MW) 
+ the actuarial value of the negotiated survivors´ pension (NW) 
= MW+NW 
(4) money wage (MW) 
+ the actuarial value of the public survivors´ pension (SW) 
= MW+SW 
In Tables 8 -12 means, medians and coefficients of variation are given. The results for 
different categories and sectors are found in Tables 8-11. The results for men and women, 
different ages, and different households are found in Tables 12a-12b. 
 
Table 8 
Money wage (annual) compared with money wage plus negotiated and public survivors´ pension rights (annual), 
thousands 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
MW        MW+NW+SW 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
  N  Median  Mean  CV  Median  Mean  CV 
Blue-collar 
workers 
             
State  57  196  195  31.3  203  198  31.9 
Local  890  145  143  29.9  146  144  29.9 
Private  1921  176  173  31.8  178  175  32.0 
All 
 
2868  164  164  32.7  166  166  32.8   16
White-collar 
workers 
             
State  364  216  230  40.0  220  235  40.8 
Local  1100  175  188  38.2  177  190  38.4 
Private  2208  217  233  58.2  220  245  58.8 
All 
 
3672  201  233  54.1  204  227  54.8 
All  6540  182  196  51.2  184  199  51.8 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
Table 9 
Money wage plus negotiated survivors´ pension rights (annual) compared with money wage plus public survivors´ 
pension rights (annual), thousands 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
MW+NW       MW+SW 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
  N  Median  Mean  CV  Median  Mean  CV 
Blue-collar 
workers 
             
State  57  201  197  31.7  198  196  31.4 
Local  890  146  144  29.8  145  143  29.9 
Private  1921  177  175  31.8  177  174  31.9 
All 
 
2868  165  166  32.8  165  165  32.8 
White-collar 
workers 
             
State  364  219  234  40.7  218  231  40.1 
Local  1100  176  190  38.3  175  188  38.3 
Private  2208  219  244  58.9  218  242  58.2 
All 
 
3672  203  226  54.7  204  224  54.1 









  N  Median  Mean  CV 
Blue-collar workers         
State  57  0.0141  0.0156  85.5 
Local  890  0.0104  0.0124  112.4 
Private  1921  0.0079  0.0113  116.1 
All 
 
2868  0.0088  0.0117  114.2 
White-collar workers         
State  364  0.0160  0.0202  104.4 
Local  1100  0.0121  0.0141  95.4 
Private  2208  0.0123  0.0160  127.3 
All 
 
3672  0.0125  0.0158  118.0 
All  6540  0.0109  0.0139  119.0 







The extended wage measure to the money wage. Average ratios. 
_____________________________________________________________________________ 
(MW+NW+SW)/MW  (MW+NW)/MW    (MW+SW)/MW 
_____________________________________________________________________________ 
Blue-collar workers       
State  1.015  1.011  1.004 
Local  1.012  1.009  1.003 
Private  1.011  1.007  1.004 
All 
 
1.011  1.008  1.004 
White-collar workers       
State  1.020  1.015  1.005 
Local  1.014  1.010  1.004 
Private  1.015  1.011  1.005 
All 
 
1.015  1.011  1.005 





Negotiated and public survivors´ pension rights´ share of the money wage. Average ratios in percent 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
          (NW+SW)/MW 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 















                 
State  1.76  (0.79)  (0.17)  1.47  (2.35)  (1.68)  0.93  (1.24)  (3.14) 
Local  1.93  1.07  0.31  1.27  1.33  1.56  0.79  1.08  1.94 





                 
State  2.67  1.21  0.17  1.48  2.41  2.43  1.12  1.88  3.86 
Local  2.13  1.14  0.20  1.22  1.59  1.53  0.86  1.18  2.43 
Private  1.97  0.85  0.24  1.34  1.95  2.00  0.87  1.71  2.75 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 







Negotiated and public survivors´ pension rights´ share of the money wage. Average ratios in percent 
_________________________________________________________________________________ 
          (NW+SW)/MW 
_________________________________________________________________________________ 
Category  Annual money 




wage £ 7.5 base 
amounts 
Married with 
children and money 
wage > 7.5 base 
amounts 
Unmarried without 
children and money 












































Note: ( ) means that number of observations is less than 20. 
 
The negotiated and public survivors´ pension rights (NW+SW) make up only a small part of 
“total” compensation (MW+NW+SW), between one and two percent of the money wage 
on the average. However, differences are found between occupational groups, between men 
and women, and between people married with families and unmarried, childless people. The 
survivors´ pension right´s share of the money wage is higher for white-collar workers than 
for blue-collar workers, higher for state employees than for employees in the private sector 
and local authority and county council employees. It is higher for men than for women. It 
                                                                   
4 23.02 per cent of all men and 4.78 per cent of all women in the study has an annual wage above 7.5 base amounts. 
23.11 per cent of the white-collar workers and 2.37 per cent of the blue-collar workers has an annual wage above 
7.5 base amounts. 25.18 per cent of employees in the state, 4.38 per cent of those in local authorities and 17.52 per 
cent of those in the private sector has an annual wage above 7.5 base amounts. Among blue-collar workers 5.26 per 
cent of those employed by the state, 0.68 per cent of those employed by local authorities and 3.07 of those 
employed in the private sector has an annual wage above 7.5 base amounts. Among white-collar workers 28.30 per 
cent of those employed by the state, 7.36 per cent of those employed by local authorities and 30.10 per cent of 
those employed in the private sector has an annual wage above 7.5 base amounts.   19
increases with age. It increases with the number of children. It is highest for those who are 
married, have many children and have an annual wage above the social insurance ceiling. 
The lowest value is found for those who are younger than 28. They do not qualify for a 
family pension or child pension in the negotiated schemes. 
The public survivors´ pension right is of about the same value for all employees. Its 
share of the money wage is about 0.4 per cent. 
In the Tables 13 and 14, we show the results of multivariate descriptions of wages 
and wage ratios. For the factors used earlier, class, sector, number of children, sex, age and 
marital status, the coefficients show the differences between the categories within each factor 
on the average, holding the other factors constant. The reference category is the last within 
each factor and the coefficients show the differences to that category. Thinking in terms of 
regression analysis with dummy variables, then the reference group is unmarried women 
aged 51-65, who are white-collar workers in the private sector and have more than one 
child. The intercepts are estimating their average wage or wage ratio and by adding the 
estimates for a selection of the other factors, estimates for other groups are obtained. The 
estimates are calculated by least squares and observations are weighted according to the 
different sampling probabilities. The fit is about 0.27 for wages and about 0.48 for the wage 
ratios according to R-squared. 
Table 13 shows the descriptions of money wages and the extended wage measures. 
We find that the wages of the blue-collar workers are over 50.000 SEK less than the wages 
of the white collars on the average for all wage concepts, and likewise a difference between 
men and women of over 60.000 SEK. There are also large differences between the age 

























A regression description of wage differentials for different wage concepts (money wage without and with negotiated 
and public survivors´ pension rights, respectively, in thousands SEK). Regression coefficients and R-squared. 
_______________________________________________________________________________ 
Wage 
            MW           MW+NW         MW+SW    MW+NW+SW 
Intercept    221.7  226.5  223.9  228.8 
Class  Blue-collar  -53.3  -54.3  -53.6  -54.6 
  White-collar  0  0  0  0 
Sector  State  -3.7  -2.8  -3.6  -2.7 
  Local  -20.4  -20.6  -20.6  -20.6 
  Private  0  0  0  0 
No of children  0  -9.2  -12.8  -10.3  -13.9 
  1  -0.4  -2.3  -1.1  -3.0 
  2-  0  0  0  0 
Sex  Men  61.6  63.8  62.5   64.7 
  Women  0  0  0  0 
Age  18-27  -66.4  -68.3  -67.8  -69.7 
  28-40  -32.9  -35.4  -34.3  -36.8 
  41-50  -9.2  -10.4  -10.1  -11.3 
  51-65  0  0  0  0 
Married/cohab  Yes  6.4  7.1  6.4  7.2 
  No  0  0  0  0 
R-squared    0.263  0.268  0.267  0.271 
 
Table 14 describes the ratios of the extended wage measures to the money wage. 
All factors are significant except sector and marital status for the public component (SW), in 
the public system these factors are not accounted for. Why there is a large difference 
between men and women at the advantage of men is partly explained by the differences in 
age between the insured man and his wife and the insured woman and her husband and by 
differences in death risks, men’s risks are between 43 to 153 percent higher than for women 
at the different ages. In the table we can see that the negotiated rights are at the advantage of 
those employed by the state and that married individuals are favoured as well as those with 
children and in the older age classes. White-collars have larger rights than blue-collars. All 












A regression description of the ratios of the extended wages (including the negotiated or the public survivors´ 
pension rights´) to the money wagein per cent. Regression coefficients and R-squared. Insignificant factors in italics 
(p>.01). 
____________________________________________________________________________ 
Share of money wage for 
     MW+NW      MW+SW       MW+NW+SW 
Intercept    102.08  101.01  103.10 
Class  Blue-collar  -0.11  -0.04  -0.15 
  White-collar  0  0  0 
Sector  State  0.40  0.00  0.41 
  Local  0.14  -0.00  0.13 
  Private  0  0  0 
No of children  0  -1.65  -0.47  -2.12 
  1  -0.91  -0.31  -1.23 
  2-  0  0  0 
Sex  Men  0.59  0.29  0.89 
  Women  0  0  0 
Age  18-27  -0.73  -0.64  -1.37 
  28-40  -0.86  -0.61  -1.47 
  41-50  -0.42  -0.40  -0.82 
  51-65  0  0  0 
Married/cohab  Yes  0.26  0.00  0.26 
  No  0  0  0 
R-squared    0.484  0.465  0.517 
 
For the public scheme (SW), those with children and of older ages fare better off, relatively. 
Differences in death risks are of course behind all age effects. There is a smaller difference 
between blue-collars and white-collars. We do not account for differences in death risks 
between classes here, these are at the disadvantage for blue-collar workers according to 
studies made, and would increase their rights if included (see Vågerö & Lundberg 1995). 
 
VII. Summary and Conclusions 
Earnings-related survivors´ pension rights are a form of labour compensation. The average 
money value of the survivors´ pension rights from the negotiated insurance schemes in   22
Sweden is estimated at 1-1.5 per cent of the money wage, and the average money value of 
the survivors´ pension rights from earnings-related social insurance system at 0.5 per cent of 
the money wage. The percentage differs between occupational groups, it is lowest for 
private blue-collar workers and highest for state employed white-collar workers, higher for 
men than for women, higher for married persons with children than for unmarried without 
children. The lowest value is found for the average blue-collar worker 18-27 years old. His 
or her survivors´ pension right is 0.3 per cent of the money wage. The highest value is found 
for the average civil servant who is married, has two or more children and a money wage 
above the social insurance ceiling. His or her survivors´ pension right is estimated at 4.7 per 
cent of the money wage. The coefficient of variance is about two per cent higher for state 
employed white-collar workers when the pension rights are included, the increase for all is 
about one per cent as compared to the CV for the money wage. 
The study indicates that wage inequality is understated when non-wage benefits in 
the form of survivors´ pension rights are excluded from the compensation measure and that a 
more complete picture of wage differentials is obtained when these rights are accounted for.   23
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